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Abstract 
This paper engages with two key concepts that define our digital cultures: the ‘network’ 
and ‘big data’. It critically considers how these concepts are often framed by techno-utopian 
or techno-dystopian political understandings of historical transformation. In the last years, the 
relationship between technological discourses and political visions, has lead to the emergence 
of critical research in the field (Mosco, 2004; Hindeman, 2010; Morozov, 2011, 2013). This 
research has shown that we cannot fully understand digital discourses without considering the 
very Western belief that technological innovation necessarily leads to new political 
possibilities. By drawing on the findings of a cross-cultural ethnographic research amongst 
three different political groups in Europe, this paper argues that current research in the field 
has focused too long on how digital discourse is shaped by Western meta-narratives of 
technological progress. This is to detriment to a careful consideration of the fact that different 
political actors discorsively construct digital technologies with reference to different political 
visions. Understanding these contested visions, the paper will show, is of central importance 
as it could enable us to appreciate that digital discourses have become today ‘empty 
signifiers’ (Laclau, 1996), which define the basis of contemporary hegemonic struggles. 
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Introduction 
The very history of the internet has been defined by messy, unpredictable and 
contradictory tensions which saw libertarian discourses of openness and freedom come 
together with the discourses of the military science about control and security (Castells, 2001; 
Curran, 2012). With its tensions and contradictions, the history of the internet sheds light on 
the fact that internet technologies have been entrenched with techno-utopian or techno-
dystopian political discourses. On the one hand these technologies seem to hold the key to 
meaningful, and democratic social change, they are seen as technologies of political 
empowerment and liberation able to re-structure the very organization of society. On the other 
hand, internet technologies are seen as reinforcing corporate power and state control and 
advancing new forms of domination.   
This paper engages with two key concepts that have come to define our digital cultures: 
the ‘network’ and ‘big data’. It critically considers how these concepts are largely shaped by  
the Western digital discourse, which assumes that  technological innovation necessarily leads 
to new historical and political possibilities. The analysis will draw on the work of those 
scholars  who have de-constructed digital discourse (Mosco, 2004, 2014; Hindeman, 2008; 
Morozov, 2011, 2013) and will argue that, athough insightful, current communication 
research on digital discourse has focused too long on Western meta-narratives of 
technological positivism. This is to detriment of a careful consideration of the fact that digital 
discourse is constructed by  different political actors according to different, and context-
specific, political visions. 	  
This paper draws on an ethnography of three political collectives and argues that 
scholars have much to gain if they understand digital discourses as ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau, 
1996) . The concept of ‘empty signifier’ shares many similarities with the concept of ‘floating 
signifier’, which became popular within structuralist thought (e.g. Levi Strauss, 1950). The 
notion was used to address those signifiers that are capable of bearing multiple meanings. As 
this paper will argue, both the concepts of ‘network’ and ‘big data’ are indeed floating 
signifiers; they bear multiple meanings and are entrenched with both techno-utopian and 
techno-dystopian visions of political possibility. 	  
	   3	  
However, as this paper will show, the network and big data are not only floating 
signifiers, but empty signifiers. The concept was used by Laclau (1996) in his work on 
Emancipation/s, to argue that there are some signifiers, that are not only floating signifiers in 
constant movement and transformation, but that they have a partial meaning attached to it 
(Simons, 2011:207), and that this meaning is often political in nature. Laclau (1996) believed 
that empty signifiers defined  hegemonic struggles, as different political forces tried to invest 
them with their own political meanings. As this paper will show, concepts like the ‘networks’ 
and ‘big data’ are indeed empty signifiers because they are embedded by different political 
actors with very different political meanings. By arguing that the concepts of the ‘network’ 
and ‘big data’ need to be understood as empty signifiers, the aim of this paper is not to 
dismiss contemporary digital thought or to argue that these concepts are not useful theoretical 
and analytical tools in the understanding of the techno-historical transformations of our times. 
Rather, the aim of this paper, is to show that digital discourse is today a contested terrain of 
imagination and practice, which defines the basis of much of contemporary hegemonic 
struggles. 	  
 
Networked Dreams, Political Realities: The Rise and Fall of the “Network” as Techno-
Utopian Discourse  
The Network as Political Possibility? From the 1990s to Today 
The development of internet gave rise to critical questions about the ways in which digital 
networks were giving rise to new forms of social and political organization. At the beginning 
of the 1990s a variety of scholars started to argue that the new information highways were 
giving rise to a new way of understanding politics, which challenged the nation-state 
(Negroponte, 1995; Toffler, 1995). At the time, Castells (1996) was perhaps one of the first 
to popularise the concept of network to make sense of this transformation. He argued that the 
internet had radically transformed society as it enabled a situation for which the network 
became a privileged and more flexible mode of social and political organization. According 
to him, the logic of the network permeated every level of social life and significantly 
transformed the way in which we understood and experienced politics, from corporate 
strategies to state policies, to the complex realities of social movements.   
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Influenced by his work, in the last two decades the concept of network has come to the 
fore as an important analytical and methodological tool in the study of digital politics. During 
the 1990s a wide variety of scholars referred to the concept in order to shed light on the rise 
of the global justice movements, and their political imaginations. The new movements, were 
defined by a new form of networked struggle, which did not rely on discipline, but on 
creativity, communication, and self-organised cooperation (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Castells, 
1997; Rheingold, 2002).  This new type of political participation, according to many, was 
fundamentally different from earlier social movements, and deconstructed older, identity-
based forms of political engagement and belonging (Juris, 2008; Day, 2005; Wolfson, 2014). 
At the heart of these works lied the overall assumption that it was the new information 
technologies that had radically transformed older forms of political participation and action, 
and that if we wanted to understand the new movements we needed to look a the more 
flexible and networked forms of political belonging and participation that internet 
technologies had enabled.  
At the beginning of the 2000s therefore we have seen the emergence of different works 
in the field that developed a new conceptual framework to make sense of the interconnection 
between these new forms of political organizing amongst activists and internet technologies. 
This is particularly evident if we consider the emergence of concepts such as the ‘multitude’ 
and ‘swarms’ amongst the autonomous Marxist (Hardt and Negri 2000, Virno 2004) or the 
idea of ‘smart mobs’ as developed by Rheingold (2002). Whilst departing from completely 
different theoretical and epistemological traditions, these concepts were used to argue that 
internet technologies had become the material basis for the enactment of new forms of social 
organizing. These concepts were grounded on the belief that the ‘network’ had become a new 
model of political organization and was offering new political possibilities for progressive 
social change.  
After 2005, with the development of Web 2.0 technologies the digital discourse of the 
network has been further reinforced. The rapid growth in usage of social media technologies 
lead different scholars to conclude that the ‘power of networks’ was transforming the world. 
Whilst Tapscott and Williams (2006) looked at how the new technologies gave rise to new 
forms of mass collaboration that challenged older economic models, Shirky (2008) believed 
that social media were creating the basis for the development of new forms of collective 
organizing. These works shared a lot of lines of similarities with Benkler’s (2006) 
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contribution on the ‘wealth of networks’. According to Benkler (2006), internet networks 
have become the material support for the development of a more egalitarian society with 
important consequences for democracy and social inclusion (2006:473). In contrast to those 
scholars that saw the internet as disorganized and caothic, Benkler (2006) argued that we 
needed to appreciate the social intelligence of networks and how the networked public sphere 
worked to create a more just and democratic society (2006:212).  
The 2008 financial crisis challenged of course the very idea that we were living a 
‘moment of opportunity’ (Benkler, 2006) and radical social change. Yet the digital discourse 
about the liberating powers of the network found a new reason to be, as the world witnessed 
the rapid rise in mass protests across the world from Iran to Egypt, Iceland, the U.S and 
Spain. The work of Castells (2012) once again became particularly emblematic of this 
cultural trend. The opening sentence of his 2012 book, is particularly revealing:  
“No one expected it. In a world darkened by economic distress, political cynicism, 
cultural emptiness and personal hopelessness, it just happened. Suddenly dictatorship 
could be overthrown with the bare hands of the people, even if their hands had been 
bloodied by the sacrifice of those fallen. Financial magicians went from being the 
objects of public envy to the targets of universal contempt. Politicians became exposed 
as corrupt liars. Governments were denounced. Media were suspected. Trust 
vanished…[….]” (Castells, 2012: 1)”. 
According to Castells (2012) this radical social change was made possible by the fact 
that internet networks had created a new space of autonomy for the exchange of information 
and the sharing of feelings of collective outrage and hope and facilitated the development of a 
new politics of resistance. In the last few years, a wide variety of scholars have turned their 
attention to the analysis of the relationship between social media activism and the mass 
uprising across the world, and have started to consider how the networking logic of these 
movements was coming together with a new logic of aggregation (Juris, 2012) assembly 
(Gerbaudo, 2012) or ‘connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). Within these works, 
one perceives the will to challenge and move beyond the concept of network (Gerbaudo, 
2012; Lovink, 2012), yet despite the effort of some, current research in the field of digital 
politics and social media activism continues to be largely reliant on the concept of ‘network’ 
(Miller et al, 2015; Sancho, 2014).  
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The Digital Discourse of the Network and Techno-Utopianism 
The debates of the last decades have thus been shaped by the understanding that the 
‘network’ represented a new form of social and political organisation. Yet, as Latour (1993) 
has argued, there is nothing new in the network as form of social organisation and any claim 
to novelty must be found in our own Western bias that obliges us to experience time and 
historical transformation as a revolution that starts over and over again (1993:70). A similar 
understanding could also be found in the work of Diani and Della Porta (1999) who explored 
the realities of social movements. Indeed, by looking at the organisation of environmental 
activists in Milan in the 1980s, Diani and Della Porta contended that the logic of networks 
was intrinsic to their social realities long before the advent of the information age (1999:117-
134). 
If networks as political and social organization always existed then why during the 1990s was 
the concept of network used to make claims of historical possibility and transformation?  
The answer to this question, as argued elsewhere (Author, 2015a; 2015b) can only be 
found in the understanding of the network as a ‘techno-utopian’ discourse. As Segal has 
argued (1985) - from Thomas More to the nineteenth-century thinkers like Saint-Simon, 
Comte, Owen, Fourier, and of course Marx and Engels (Segal, 1985: 2) – Western societies 
have been shaped by the understanding that technologies, and in particular new technologies 
can bring important transformations in terms of social justice and democratic emancipation. 
What is fascinating about these techno-utopian discourses is that they are tightly 
interconnected to processes of technological fetishism whereby humans invest technological 
objects with specific forms of powers, and believe that these objects are able to move and 
shape the world (Harvey, 2003: 3; Mosco, 2004; Morley, 2006).  
It is only by considering the interconnection between techno-utopianism and techno-
fetishism that we can fully appreciate the ‘network’ as digital discourse. In fact, if we look at 
works like the one of Castells or Hardt and Negri, which have been so influential in shaping 
understandings of digital politics, the network is highly fetishized and entrenched with 
techno-utopian understandings of progressive social transformation. Within these works, as 
argued (Author, 2015), the network becomes an autonomous political agent, which is defined 
by the conjunction between a self-organizing collective intelligence and internet technologies 
and is capable of transforming politics by fostering new and horizontal forms of political 
organization. 
Once we realize that the network operates as powerful digital discourse, we need to 
critically consider the different impacts this discourse has on everyday political practice. As 
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Gerbaudo has shown, for instance, within the indignados and Occupy movements, the 
discourse of the network enabled the creation of a ‘soft’ type of leadership (Gerbaudo, 2012).  
On the contrary, as Trere and Barassi (2015) have shown, the ideological discourse of the 
network was used by the 5SM in Italy to justify and reinforce authoritarian political practices.  
 
 
Liberation or Domination? Techno-Utopian and Techno-Dystopian Visions in the 
Shaping of Digital Discourse 
The understanding that the network is a digital discourse shaped by the interconnection 
of utopian and fetishists ideas of technological change and progress is influenced by those 
works in communication research, which have considered the discursive construction of 
digital technologies. Mosco’s (2004) ground breaking book on the ‘digital sublime’, for 
instance, has demonstrated that the Western fascination with the ‘newness’ of technologies 
has enabled us to construct mythical understandings of how digital media are supposedly 
socially transformative and democratically empowering.  
Following a similar line of reasoning Hindman’s (2008) talked about the importance of 
deconstructing ‘the myths of digital democracy’. He argued that much of digital discourse is 
shaped by the understanding that the internet is democratizing politics because it is providing 
citizens with a new ‘political voice’ by giving them the possibility to participate to society by 
sharing and expressing their opinions and ideas. In his book he challenges these 
understandings, and in particular he deconstructs Benkler’s notion of ‘networked public 
sphere’ by showing how within the infranstructure of the internet political voices are not 
equal.  
Whilst Hindman (2008) largely focused on the concept of ‘political voice’, Morozov (2011) 
highlighted the idea of political ‘delusion’. In his book, he focused on Green Revolution in 
Iran, and argued that this uprising was largely shaped by the Western political delusion in the 
democratic and empowering potential of social media, especially Twitter. In his book he 
deconstructs this discourse, and argues that social media were used as a tool of governmental 
surveillance and repression as well as for political organisation and mobilisation. 
All these works are of key importance as they highlight not only how digital discourse 
is shaped by techno-utopian visions of political transformation, but also how Western 
understandings of political transformation is largely shaped by digital discourse. What we are 
missing from the current literature on digital discourse, is a careful appreciation that digital 
discourse have come to bear a plurality of meanings. In fact, much of the current 
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communication literature focuses on meta-narratives of technological positivism, and only 
rarely consider the fact that digital discourses are simultaneously shaped by techno-utopian 
and techno-dystopian political visions.  As Segal (1985) has shown, however, techno-utopianism is only one side of the coin in 
debates about technological progress and impact. Western Social Thought has not only been 
dominated by utopian understandings of technological progress, which sees technologies as 
directly interconnected to new forms of social emancipation and justice, but also by techno-
dystopian understandings of technologies as tools of suppression and control. Indeed, as 
Gordin et al. (2010) have shown we cannot really understand utopian visions without 
appreciating their dystopian counter parts.	  
The fact that techno-utopian and techno-dystopian discourses are the two sides of the 
same coin, is evident in scholarly debates about the network. Within the works of both Hardt 
and Negri (2000) and Castells (2009) the network is not only an agent of liberation and 
political possibility but it also an agent of political control. For Hardt and Negri (2000:160-
183) ‘network power’ was at the heart of the new World order defined by U.S. Sovereignity. 
For Castells (2009), in a global context in which mass communication has moved beyond 
traditional media to include the internet and mobile technologies, it is of fundamental 
importance to highlight the networks of power that are constructed by global multimedia 
business, and understand how these relate to national and international politics (2009:71-99). 
Therefore, the network within both works was seen as an agent of resistance as well as an 
agent of domination.  
The understanding of the network as reinforcing new forms of power and domination 
became a wide spread discourse in the 2000s. If we look at the communication literature of 
the last decade we find many scholars who argue that digital networks far from being 
democratic, were creating a situation whereby the production of user data was systematically 
surveilled by corporations and governments (Andrejevic, 2004, 2012; Terranova, 2000, 2004; 
Fuchs, 2008).What is particularly fascinating about these works is that – in contrast to the 
techno-utopian belief in the power of the network –they were entrenched with dystopian 
visions about corporate control and digital surveillance. Here the works of Andrejevic (2004, 
2009) and Jarrett (2008) are particularly revealing. Both relied on Foucualt’s notion of 
‘panopticon’ (Foucault, [1985] 2012)   and Orwells’ ([1949] 2016)  notion of Big Brother to 
argue that through the extensive use of web 2.0 technologies individuals were not only 
constantly ‘surveiled’ for corporate or political reasons, but were also increasingly adopting 
practices of co-surveillance associated with marketing and law enforcement. According to 
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Andrejevic (2004, 2009), therefore, web technologies can be seen as fostering the 
internalization of the strategies used by corporations and governments, and their deployment 
in the private sphere. We can find a similar argument also in the work of Jarrett (2008) who 
argued that interactivity acted as ‘disciplining technology’.  
In 2013, with the Snowden revelations, not only the techno-dystopian visions of total 
digital surveillance seemed to find the materialization in the political reality of the NSA, but 
as Lyon (2014) has shown digital surveillance seemed to be largely augmented by the new, 
techno-historical context of ‘big data’ (2014: 4). Here below I want to engage precisely with 
the concept of big data and to show, that similarly to the concept of network, also this 
concept has been entrenched with techno-utopian and techno-dystopian discourses of 
liberation and domination.  
 
The Rise of Big Data: From Techno-Utopian Dreams of Scientific Accuracy to 
Dystopian Visions of Surveillance  
Techno-utopian Dreams of Scientific Accuracy and the question of Data 
The notion of ‘big data’ was introduced to start to make sense of the concentration of 
data in large datasets, which required supercomputers and hence the term ‘big’ data 
(Manovich, 2011).  However, in the last five years, it has been used to signify different 
technological and cultural processes that enable the storage and organization of data. 
According to boyd and Crawford (2012) cultural narratives of big data have been shaped by 
two interconnected beliefs: a) the metadata produced by users is ‘raw data’, or in other words 
is a primary form of data, which has not been subjected to processing and manipulation b) 
algorithmic logic and larger datasets offer us a precise and accurate type of knowledge, which 
enables us to frame individual and social patterns and use this knowledge for different 
purposes. The underlying belief is that big datasets offer a higher form of intelligence and 
accurate knowledge that was not possible before (boyd and Crawford, 2012:663).  
If we consider one belief at the time we would quickly be able to shed light on the 
ideological dimensions of such beliefs, and on the fact that we are confronted with yet 
another example of techno-utopian discourse. In the first place, as Gitelman and Jackson 
(2013) have rightly argued ‘raw data’ is an oxymoron, a rhetorical figure which juxtaposes 
two concepts which are in fact contradictory. There is no such thing as ‘raw’ data. Most of 
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the data that is collected is metadata, in other words, it is data that describes other ‘data’ (e.g. 
clicks, personal info etc.). Hence at the time of collection, data has already been organized 
according to specific systems and structures.These systems and structures have been shaped 
by specific cultural values and beliefs. Hence all processes of data collection need to take into 
account not only how specific information structures frame data but also how data collection 
itself is framed.  
In the second place, as different scholars have shown (Manovich, 2011; boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Crawford, 2013; Gitelman and Jackson, 2013; Boellerstroff, 2013) we do 
not have any evidence that supports the understanding that larger datasets offer us a precise 
and accurate form of knowledge on individuals. As boyd and Crawford have argued: 
“too often, Big Data enables the practice of apophenia: seeing patterns where none 
actually exist, simply because enormous quantities of data can offer connections that 
radiate in all directions.” (boyd and Crawford, 2013: 668). 
Of course through the collection of digital data we can trace connections and patterns, and 
most probably identify key issues. Yet the knowledge we acquire from these connections and 
patterns is not necessarily accurate, as this type of data is a type of data, which is 
systematically taken out of context (boyd and Crawford, 2012:670-671; Boellerstroff, 2013). 
Hence, as Couldry and Powell (2014) have argued we are confronted by a ‘potential 
disconnect between system and experience’. 
 If larger data sets do not necessarily lead to greater accuracy, then how can we 
understand this techno-utopian discourse? According to Mosco (2014) and Van Dijck (2014) 
such an understanding needs to be found in a profound digital positivism, and in the idea that 
data will speak for itself. Behind this cultural narrative lies a deeply problematic political 
economic system of surveillance capitalism (Mosco, 2014), which is based on the belief that 
it is essential to ‘mine the life’ of citizens (Van Dijck, 2014), to gather, store, and control 
larger and larger amounts of digital data. Both Mosco’s and Van Dijck’s works are crucial 
when we want to start tackling the ideology of big data. Yet what is missing from these 
works is a careful appreciation that the ideology of big data is not only defined by techno-
utopian visions of digital positivism but also – as we shall see here below - by techno-
dystopian ideas of digital surveillance. 
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Dystopian Visions of Surveillance: From DataVaillance to the Quantified Self 
As argued above, the understanding of digital technologies as tools of surveillance 
and control is of course not new and became a widespread discourse within the 
communication literature of the 2000s. However, in the last five years, following the 
Snowden affair a more complex and dark scenario emerged, and scholars have intensified 
understandings of digital surveillance. In fact, different scholars have started to turn the 
attention to the multiple ways in which changes in digital technologies augmented the rise of 
new, technologically assisted forms of governance (e.g. border policing; health surveillance 
etc.) and have argued that digital surveillance impacts on every aspect of citizen life (Raley, 
2013; Hartzog and Selinger, 2013; Andrejevic et al., 2013; Staples, 2013; Lyon, 2014).  
Either indirectly or indirectly these understandings are based on Clarke’s (1988)  
definition of ‘dataveillance’. In the mid Eighties, Clarke coined the term ‘dataveillance’ to 
describe a social and political transformation which saw the reduction in practices of face to 
face surveillance and an increase in the surveillance of citizens’ data. According to Clarke 
(1988) the increased surveillance of people’s behaviors was made possible through the rise in 
data trails that their behavior was generating. In sum, his work has shown not only that 
through everyday practices, citizens’ left behind personal traces that enabled their digital 
surveillance but also that governing bodies and institutions encouraged and reinforced these 
digital practices.  
In the last few years, therefore we have seen the emergence of key research in the 
field that has highlighted different dimensions of dataveillance, from the analysis of the 
interconnection between private and public bodies in the shaping of digital surveillance 
(Hintz, 2014) to the analyses of self-tracking technologies and the making of the quantified 
self (Smith, 2016; Lupton, 2016). The underlying assumption behind these works is that a 
new culture of surveillance is emerging and threatening people’s privacy, and autonomy.  
The recent debates about digital surveillance are insightful and critical, and shed light 
on some of the techno-historical complexities of our times. Yet we cannot fail to notice that 
these works are influenced by techno-dystopian ideas of the inevitability of digital 
surveillance, and often do not take into account how people understand and negotiate with 
big data. This latter point emerges very well in the work of Couldry and Powell (2014) as 
well as in the one of Kennedy et al. (2015), who argue that understandings of big data need to 
consider not only the potential disconnect between system and experience, but also the 
multiple ways in which alternative publics are appropriating ‘big data’ and transforming its 
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meaning. These understandings are particularly important if we want to challenge, as Sharon 
and Zandbergen (2016) have argued, the data-fetishism intrinsic to much research about big 
data.  
In understanding the discourses about big data than we need to highlight how these 
discourses do not take into account the meaning data has for people, and the multiple and 
complex ways in which people negotiate and resist to data flows. Between 2007 and 2011, I 
carried an ethnographic research amongst activists in the UK, Italy and Spain, which 
continued with follow up interviews and a digital ethnographic research until 2014. The 
research project enabled me to shed light on the different ways in which activists have been 
reacting to the web developments of the last decade. The research design was grounded on 
the belief that political collectives, which were shaped by different political cultures, would 
react differently to web developments.  
The three organizations were, therefore, chosen because they largely differed in 
political cultures and ideologies. The first organization is the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, a 
British international campaigning group that was created in 1978 and is attached to the 
political ideologies of the British Trade Union movement. The second organization is 
Ecologistas en Acción, an environmental activist group that was funded in 1998 during the 
global justice movements, and is based on a political culture that combines radical left ideals 
with environmental awareness. The third organization, the Corsari, was created in 2008 and 
is embedded in the Italian autonomous movement, which is based on political culture that 
highlights the importance of self-management, political autonomy and direct action.  
One interesting element that emerged during fieldwork, as argued elsewhere (Author, 
2015) was that although activists were clearly concerned about the problem of digital 
surveillance they also believed that there were many margins for resistance and freedom. 
This is not only because they could limit the type of information that they shared on the web, 
but also because they strongly believed that the ‘tracing of digital identities’ does not 
necessarily mean that governments and corporations have the control of personal identities. 
This latter point emerged particularly well in an interview with Davide, an activist involved 
in the autonomous movement in Italy: 
D:  Of course companies try to appropriate and exploit our information, yet 
they don’t really succeed in framing our personal identities. The problem that 
companies face is that your individual identity is often different from your 
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digital identity. You can be a friend on Facebook of the PD (Democratic Party 
in Italy), to monitor their activities but in truth hating them. You could be 
playing an online game and not being interested in gambling [...] there is no 
exact correspondence between online activities and real life, although they 
make you believe that there is. 
As Davide highlighted, people’s practices can be unpredictable, and thus the 
construction of metadata does not necessarily translate into a mirror of social reality, 
especially because metadata does not uncover the human ‘intention’ or reasoning between 
specific online choices. This understanding enables us to appreciate the fact that the ‘tracking 
of digital identities’ is not always that effective and all-encompassing as the ‘panopticon’ 
model of big brother surveillance wants us to believe (Andrejevic, 2009). 
In understanding the techno-historical developments of our times, therefore, we need to 
appreciate the fact that people understand and use technologies in multiple and unpredictable 
ways, which vary from context to context, from situation to situation. Consequently, analyses 
of big data require a greater cultural sensitivity, and should highlight the multiple and 
complex ways in which people are understanding and negotiating with the datafication of 
everyday life.  As the next and final part of this article will show, one way in which we can 
start re-introducing understandings of agency and cultural sensitivity in the analyses of big 
data is by appreciating that digital discourses are contested terrains of meaning, and have 
come to define much of contemporary hegemonic struggles. 	  
Contested Visions: Digital Discourses as Empty Signifiers 
The Network as a Contested Ideology 
As I approached fieldwork in 2007, I was influenced by the scholarly debates on the 
importance of ‘networks’, and in particular by the works of scholars like Castells (1997) and 
Juris (2008) who had argued that networking logic had significantly transformed the realities 
of social movements. Fieldwork within the Labor movement in the UK revealed that this was 
indeed the case, and that the discourses about digital networks were transforming old political 
ideologies. This latter point emerged particularly well as I was trying to make sense of how 
participants understood the concept of ‘political solidarity’. During the Thatcher years, as 
various participants explained to me, solidarity was seen as a fundamental signifier of the 
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Labor movement in Britain. This was particularly true, when Thatcher made solidarity 
demonstrations and strikes illegal, in order to counter-act the wave of workers’ discontent 
that was sweeping across the country. Solidarity in that context meant political opposition to 
the injustices of the conservative government, and coalition amongst workers. Furthermore, 
at the time, the concept of solidarity was also attached to the socialist beliefs of the Third 
International, and therefore to the international Labor movement.  
During fieldwork solidarity as a rhetorical discourse was being re-defined through the 
logic of networks. In contrast to the socialist logic of solidarity, which was largely shaped 
upon the idea of collective identity amongst workers, when talking about political solidarity, 
participants emphasized the importance of developing a broad campaign that included people 
from various political backgrounds. In constructing a new understanding of political 
solidarity – which was based on an idea of joining forces for a common interest no matter if 
the people involved in the struggle came from conflicting backgrounds – participants 
discursive practices were directed at the systematic and conscious deconstruction of the 
jargon of political identity. Despite people were discursively re-shaping their understanding 
of political identity in more flexible and networked ways, they still believed in the hegemonic 
project. For them, political and digital networks between social movement actors, therefore, 
was still anchored to the idea that it was of central importance to build a collective, common 
struggle, able to achieve validation from the state.  
During my research within the Corsari and Ecologistas, I realized that the discourse of 
the network as a space of ‘political possibility’ varied enormously from context to context . 
Within both political contexts, the logic of network was used not merely to reinforce ideas of 
‘political solidarity’, as it happened in the context of CSC, but more significantly to reinforce 
ideas of political autonomy. The network was seen as a way to enable different organizations 
and individuals to ‘be exactly what they were’, without having to have to abandon their 
political identity in the pursue of a collective, common sense of belonging. In contrast to the 
CSC, the political ideologies of the Corsari and the Ecologistas were not anchored in the idea 
that the network was an organizational structure that would enable them to achieve 
recognition from the state. On the contrary, influenced by the discourses of post-foundational 
politics (Holloway, 2002; Day, 2005) they believed that the emancipations of political 
identities are constantly instrumentalized by the state. For them, the network was a political 
possibility that enabled the construction of different alternative models of being and 
organizing together.  
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By comparing the different political imaginations that were attached to the network, 
My ethnographic work revealed that the digital discourse of the network was a contested 
space of meaning. In fact, activists not only had to come to terms with the tension between 
their digital discourses on the meaning of networks and the digital discourses constructed by 
other movements, but they also had to make sense of the fact that their digital discourses 
about the power of networks clashed with the ideologies promoted by corporate interest and 
web developers. As argued by Fisher (2010), the network logic dominated the world of 
business, and the network was seen as the expression not only of new participatory consumer 
engagement, but also of new forms of capitalist production, consumption and exploitation. 
By drawing on the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), Fisher (2010) argued that the 
digital discourse of the network worked as a form of capitalist justification and legitimation. 
During fieldwork, it became clear that activists were aware of the ways in which the network 
discourse was reinforcing new forms of corporate exploitation. Still they invested the 
network with their own cultural meanings. By looking at the tensions between different 
visions of networks, therefore, my research revealed that digital discourse cannot be 
understood as a meta-cultural narrative (e.g. see Mosco, 2004, 2014; Hindman, 2008; 
Morozov, 2011, 2013) but rather as contested terrain of imagination and practice.  
Digital Discourses as Empty Signifiers, and the Hegemonic Struggle for Big Data 
One way in which we can make sense of the contested meanings that are attached to dogotal 
discourse is  – as Stalder (2006:169) has argued in his critique to Castells – by understanding 
that concepts such as ‘network’ and ‘big data’ are in fact ‘empty signifiers’. The concept of 
‘empty signifier’ is tightly interconnected with the concept of ‘floating signifier’, which was 
used within structuralist thought (e.g. Levi Strauss, 1950) to address those signifiers that do 
not have a distinctive meaning and are capable of bearing multiple meanings. However, in 
1996, with his work on Emancipation/s, Laclau (1996) has argued that the difference 
between the floating and the empty signifier is a structural one, while the floating signifier is 
in constant movement and transformation, the empty signifier has a partial meaning attached 
to it (Simons, 2011:207).  
        Laclau (1996) powerfully suggested that our societies depend largely upon ‘empty 
signifiers’, and that ‘empty signifiers’ are largely political, and they define the basis of 
hegemonic struggles. In order to prove his argument he took as example the concept of 
‘democracy’. ‘Democracy’ is an empty signifier because it is a concept that is essentially 
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ambiguous. Empty signifiers are ambiguous, and represent the power of the absence, because 
instead of reflecting reality, they are absent from it (1996: 38-46). Despite not reflecting 
reality ‘empty signifiers’ still have a fundamental meaning for human beings; their absence 
has an immense power. Laclau’s insight lies in the fact that he understands hegemony as the 
processes through which ‘different forces attempt to fix meanings to these empty signifiers’ 
(1996, 38-46).  
         If we look at the digital discourses of the network, as argued above, we would quickly 
realize that in the last decade social movements and power forces alike have tried to fix it 
with a meaning. The type of meaning that they tried to fix was largely dependent upon very 
different political visions. It is for this reason that we need to appreciate the fact that, digital 
discourses have become the basis of much of contemporary hegemonic struggles. This 
understanding is particularly important today as we try to make sense of the techno-historical 
transformations brought about by big data.  
       As mentioned above, in the last two years, scholars have argued that when talking about 
big data we need to critically engage with notions of ‘reflexivity’ (Couldry and Powell, 
2014), ‘agency’ (Kennedy et al, 2015) and to take into account the multiple ways in which 
social actors are making sense of data (Sharon and Zandbergen, 2016). These questions have 
become particularly important amongst those scholars working on social movements and 
data activism (Schrock, 2016; Baack, 2015; Milan, 2015), which have shown how activists 
are not only finding ways to negotiate with big data, but their appropriating discourses of 
data to imagine and create new political and technological possibilities. The understanding of 
these processes of negotiation and political imagination, can enable us to move beyond 
techno-utopian and techno-dystopian visions of historical possibility of big data, and 
appreciate the unpredictability and complexity of the techno-historical developments of our 
times. 
Conclusion  
This paper has focused on two different concepts that define our digital cultures: the concept 
of ‘network’ and the concept of ‘big data’. By exploring the history of these concepts, the 
multiple ways in which they have been applied and understood, the paper has argued that 
these concepts have been largely shaped by techno-utopian and techno-dystopian discourses 
of political possibilities. In highlighting the techno-utopian and techno-dystopian political 
visions that define concepts such as ‘network’ and ‘big data’, the intention of this paper was 
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not to argue that they are not relevant to an analysis of digital culture.  On the contrary, when 
scholars like Castells (1996, 1997) or Hardt and Negri (2000, 2001) were arguing that the 
network was enabling the rise of new forms of resistance as well as the formation of new 
structures of power, they were indeed describing important social and cultural changes. 
Similarly, when scholars argue that big data is enabling a new politics of intrusive digital 
surveillance into people’s life (Lyon, 2014) they are highlighting some critical impacts of 
technological innovation.  Hence there is no doubt that these concepts find validation in the 
political realities we live in and shed light on the political complexities of our digital 
ecologies.  Yet when we look at concepts such ‘network’ and big data’ we need to appreciate 
them also for their underlying ideological component. Technological change is unpredictable, 
it varies from context to context from situation to situation, and the pursuit of a general 
concept to explain this transformation is indeed ‘utopian’.   
One way in which we can challenge techno-utopian and techno-dystopian visions of 
digital change, is by focusing on digital discourse and by highlighting the fact that digital 
discourse is constructed by different political visions, which vary from context to context, 
from situation to situation. As this paper has argued, within the everyday lives of social 
movements, not only digital discourses vary from movement to movement but activists need 
to make sense of how their political imaginations of technological change clash with the 
ideologies of digital technologies promoted by power forces. Understanding these contested 
visions is essential if we want to appreciate the fact that digital discourses have become today 
‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau, 1996), and define the basis of much of contemporary hegemonic 
struggles.  
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